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Goetschi, Remo and Kuznets, Roman
Realization for justification logics via nested sequents: Modularity through em-
bedding. Ann. Pure Appl. Logic 163, (2012). 1271–1298,
Justification logic (JL) is a refinement of modal logic (ML) in which it is possible
to refer to the specific “evidence” supporting the assignment of the necessity
operator. A is given an epistemic (“A is known”) or a provability reading
(“A” is provable). In JL the evidence supporting the ascription of  is denoted
by some justification term: the formula t : A of JL thus is to be interpreted
as “A is known on the basis of t” or “t is a proof for A”. Realization is the
operation of replacing the modalities in a formula of modal propositional logic by
justification terms. A realization theorem relates an ML to a JL via realization:
It states that (i) each theorem of the ML can be transformed by realization into
a formula of the JL and that (ii) justification terms in the theorems of the JL
can be conversely replaced by modalities in such a way that this replacement
yields theorems of the ML. The article investigates by proof-theoretic (hence
constructive) methods the question for realization theorems for the 15 logics of
the “modal cube”: K, D, T, KB, K4, K5, DB, D4, D5, TB, S4, K45, D45, S5,
and KB5.1
The language of modal logic used by Goetschi and Kuznets in their investi-
gation comprises the set of formulas which can be built up from a denumerable
infinite pool of propositional variable (Pi, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . }) by the following
operations: negation of variables, disjunction, conjunction, prefixing by , and
prefixing by ♦. Negation is extended to complex formulas by using the law of
double negation and the De Morgan rules. Other connectives are defined in
standard ways. Calculi for the logics of the modal cube result from a stan-
dard axiomatization of K by adding (possibly no) axiom schemes from the list:
b, d, t, 4, 5 (cf. the right column of Table 1 below). There are 25 such calculi but
only 15 logics, i.e., different sets of theorems, axiomatized by them. The calculi
are systematically named by adding to the letter “K” the capitalized names
of the added principles. The logics axiomatized by these calculi, on the other
hand, receive the names commonly used for them in the literature and quoted
above at the end of the previous paragraph. The logic (set of theorems) S4 is
axiomatized by KT4 and (redundantly) by KDT4, the logic S5 corresponds to
no less than 13 calculi, and the logic KB4 corresponds to three.
Modal Logic Justification Logic
d: ⊥ → ⊥ jd: t : ⊥ → ⊥
t : A→ A jt : t : A→ A
b: A→ ¬¬A jb: A→ ?¯t : (¬ t : ¬A)
4: A→ A j4: t : A→ !t : t : A
5: ¬A→ ¬A j5: ¬ t : A→ ?t : (¬ t : A)
Table 1: Basic Principles of Modal and Justification Logic
1Here TB is the Brouwerian system traditionally denoted by “B”. The latter label is avoided
in order to eschew the misinterpretation that “B” is a traditional name for the system which
should bear the more systematic name “KB” (as, for instance, “D” is a traditional shortcut
for the more systematic “KD”); cf. the next paragraph of the main text.
The language of JL comprises again an infinite set of propositional variables
Pi (i = 1, 2, 3, . . .), a stock of justification constants (c
j
i , i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . },
where j indicates the level of the constant), and a set of justification variables
(xi i ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . }). Justification terms are built up by the binary operations
of multiplication (t · t′) and addition (t+ t′) as well as by the unary operations !
(positive introspection), ? (negative introspection) and ?¯ (weak negative intro-
spection). The formulas of the language of JL are built up from the propositional
variables (Pi, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . }) and the falsum ⊥ by means of the conditional
operator and by prefixing a justification term (seperated by a colon from the
prefixed formula). The basic system of JL corresponding to the modal system
K is called J; it extends an axiomatization of the classical propositional calculus
(based on modus ponens as inference rule and a finite set of axiom schemes) by
the two axiom schemes (app) and the (sum).
app s : (A→ B)→ (t : A→ (s · t) : B)
sum s : A→ (s + t) : A and s : A→ (t + s) : A
iAN
A is an axiom instance
cnin : c
n




Corresponding to the extensions of the basic logic K considered, there are
analogue JLs extending J by the JL-counterparts of the principles added to
K; cf. Table 1 above. The naming convention used for JLs is similar to that
for modal logics. Since, however, different proofs of the same formula provide
different evidences for that formula, equivalent but different axiomatization of
the same modal logic normally do not lead up to the same JL. Nevertheless the
five principles above do not result in the maximal number of 32 different logics
since the addition of d, which is just a special instance of t, to a system which
already contains the latter principle does not change the “proof potential” of
the thus extended calculus. Hence there are only 24 = 24 + 23 different JLs
corresponding to the 15 modal logics.
As already explained, modal formulas are realized by replacing the modal op-
erators by suitable justification terms. Since it may be necessary in this process
to replace different occurences of the same modal operator by different terms,
occurences of  and ♦ are distinguished by indexing them with positive natu-
ral numbers; boxes receive odd, diamonds even numbers. Formulas with thus
indexed modal operators are called annotated formulas. A formula is properly
annotated iff every index occurs only once in it. A realization function is a par-
tial function assigning justification terms to postitive natural numbers in such a
way that each even number 2m is assigned the variable xm. Let r be a realization
function, then for each annotated modal formula A the JL formular (A)r realiz-
ing A wrt. r is inductively defined as follows: (1) (Pi)
r := Pi; (2) (¬Pi)r := ¬Pi;
(3) (B ◦ C)r := Br ◦ Cr (◦ ∈ {∧,∨}); (4) (♦2mA)r := ¬ r(2m) : ¬Ar; and (5)
(2m−1A)r := r(2m− 1) : Ar. The clause for the diamond is motivated by the
intutition that subformulas prefixed by a diamond represent assumptions which
correspond to Skolem variables when boxes are paraphrased by “there exists a
proof . . . ”. The forgetful projection A◦ of a JL formula A is inductively defined
by the following clauses: (1) P ◦i := Pi; (2) ⊥◦ := ⊥; (3) (A→ B)◦ := A◦ → B◦;
and (4) (t : A)◦ := A◦. If M is a set of JL formulas (possibly, a JL itself),
M◦ := {A◦ |A ∈M}.
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The first main result of the article is the following general realization theo-
rem: Let ML be one of the 15 logics of the modal cube and JL its justification
logic counterpart as defined in Table 2. Then for each theorem A′ of ML there
is an annotation A of A′ and a realization function r such that Ar belongs to JL.
Conversely: JL◦ = ML. In order to prove this theorem, not the Hilbert-style ax-
K D T KB K4 K5 DB D4
J JD JT JB J4 J5 JDB JD4
D5 TB S4 K45 D45 S5 KB5
JD5 JTB JT4 J45 JD45 JT45 JB45
Table 2: Modal logics and their justification logic counterparts.
iomatizations of the modal logics are used but rather axiomatization by cut-free
systems of nested (or deep) sequents due to Kai Bru¨nnler [MR2525446]. Deep se-
quents are essentially disjunctively interpreted sequences of formulas. However,
besides simple concatenation (of formula sequences) there is another constructor
of deep sequents, namely the “embedding” Σ , [∆] of a sequent ∆ as an item into
a host sequent Σ . A nested sequence with such embeddings has a tree-like struc-
ture. In the simplest case, however, where Σ is just the sequence A1, A2, . . . , Am
of formulas and ∆ consists of the single formula B, the nested sequent Σ , [∆] is
interpreted in the same way as the formula A1 ∨A2 ∨ . . .∨Am ∨ B. The main
difficulty to overcome in the proof is connected with the contraction rule of the
sequent system, which eliminates repetitions of formulas in a deep sequent. The
difficulty is overcome by adapting to the proof-theoretic framework applied by
Goetschi and Kuznets a technique developed by Melvin Fitting [MR2552753]
within a semantic framework .
The realization theorem just described leaves nine of the 24 JLs without a
matching ML. These are, of course, those logics which correspond to modal logics
(S5, and KB5) having (non-trivially)2 different but equivalent axiomatization
giving rise to different JL counterparts of which only one is selected in Table
2 as the “standard” JL counterpart. Table 3 provides an overview over these
cases; the standard counterpart of a ML is underlined.
Modal Logic Justification Logic Counterparts
KB5 JB4, JB5, JB45
S5 JT5, JT45, JTB45, JTB4, JDB4, JDB45, JDB5, JTB5
Table 3: Modal logics with different justification logic counterparts
Obviously, what is needed in order to capture also the nine unmatched JLs
(which appear as non-underlined items in the right column of Table 3) is a suit-
able notion of equivalence ≡ between JLs such that realization turns out to be
invariant under ≡ in the following sense: if JL2 ≡ JL1 and JL1 realizes a certain
ML, then JL2, too, realizes that ML. Such a notion of equivalence is defined in
the second part of the article in terms of a notion of embedding, which again is
inspired by the work of Fitting [MR2552753]. Roughly, a justification logic JL1
2S4 has the two axiomatization KT4 and KDT4. But since d is, as already, noted only an
instance of t, these two axiomatization differ only trivially.
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is said to embed in another one JL2 if the justification operations (+, ·, !, ?, ?¯)
of JL1 are definable within JL2 in such a way that, by use of the definitions,
theorems of JL1 translate into theorems of JL2. (The reader should note that all
JLs considered are formulated in the same language and hence have the same
justification terms. However, due to the presence or absence of axioms the justi-
fication operations may have different meanings in different logics such that, for
instance, the !-operation of the first logic does not correspond to the !-operation
of the second though it might definable by a complex term of the second logic.)
If this is actually the case, special definitions are necessary for establing equiva-
lence.) Equivalence, then, is defined as mutual embedding. Furthermore, logics
occuring in the same row of Table 3 turn out to be equivalent. Making use of
these equivalences, the realization theorem proved in the first part of the article
can easily be extended to the logics displayed in Table 3.
Reviewed by Klaus Robering
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